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I
INTRODUCTION

For two decades, political commentators and legal academics have loudly
bemoaned the trend toward restrictive definition of constitutional rights.
Although the Constitution has not vanished, the Supreme Court has been
narrowing rights in important areas such as abortion regulation, criminal

procedure, religious freedom, and school desegregation. Much of this constriction has followed the expression of political opposition to earlier, more expansive
judicial decisions.' No matter what the Justices assert or believe about the legal
justifications for recent limitations, it is possible that this opposition has been a
significant consideration. The instinctive reaction of many observers, especially
those with legal training, is to recoil at the thought of fundamental principles
being diluted in response to popular pressure. This article tests this understandable reaction by asking directly whether federal judges should take political

resistance into account when interpreting the Constitution.
The instinct to condemn what the Supreme Court has referred to as
"compromises with social and political pressures" 2 is strong, but it is, at least
superficially, at odds with aspects of our complex traditions.3 Many eminent

jurists, including John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and William Brennan,
have emphasized that constitutional meaning should have a political component
and, at least on occasion, have urged that interpretation be viewed as an
institutionally shared enterprise. This tradition has been embraced by statesmen

like Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln, and has been expounded upon by scholars
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such as Thayer, Bickel, and Choper. It is reflected in various deferential
standards, most notably the minimum rationality requirement used in equal
protection and due process analysis, as well as judicial constructions of the
Commerce Clause and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Our legal
traditions, in short, contain both philosophical and doctrinal strands that involve
some degree of political influence over constitutional content. This does not
necessarily imply that the national judiciary should consider, let alone yield to,
resistance to announced decisional law. But it does suggest that the contrary
conclusion may be harder to explain than we expect.
I begin this article with an overview of various forms of resistance and the
range of assessments that are commonly made of them. In particular, I discuss
the objections that can be made to state and local acts that, while not directly
defiant, are premised on disagreements with the Court's decisions, and are
designed to obstruct or reverse them. This form of resistance is of special
interest because it is most likely to have been influential over contemporary
interpretations.
I then examine two judicial practices that are often overlooked, even by those
who see constitutional interpretation as a shared, dialogic enterprise. The
utilization of received traditions as a basis for defining unenumerated rights is
the focus of part III, and the tendency to expand constitutional protections
because of anticipated or actual dissension is examined in part IV. My analysis
suggests that widespread acceptance of these practices is inconsistent with our
usual conclusions about what constitutes inappropriate political influence.
Assuming (as many believe) that recent restrictive interpretations of constitutional rights are misguided and that they are, in part, a response to local political
dissatisfaction with earlier decisions, the Rehnquist Court may be incorrectly
evaluating relevant considerations, but I doubt that the Court is taking into
account irrelevant considerations.
II
FORMS OF RESISTANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW

The range of ways in which political influence can be brought to bear on
judicial interpretation is wide and varied. At the high end of formality and
legitimacy is amendment, which has been used both to overturn specific decisions
and to initiate more general changes of direction. At the low end are violent
threats and acts intended to intimidate judges or to block implementation of
their decrees. In between are an array of devices and behaviors, including:
appointment of judges; enactment of federal statutes or use of the presidential
veto power; executive rulemaking; impeachment; congressional control over
funding, jurisdiction, and other incidents of judicial power; state and local
regulations of various kinds; public intellectual efforts, such as academic or
journalistic commentary; private intellectual efforts, such as letters to judges and
personal conversations; street demonstrations; sluggish compliance with judicial
orders; inactivity by those who are yet to be sued; interference by nonparties
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with the implementation of a decree; and outright refusal by defendants to
comply. Each of these forms of influence has its own set of variations. For
example, the objective of an academic article might be to urge the reversal of a
specific case or a massive change in basic understanding; street demonstrations
can occur before, during, or after formal adjudication. Legislative resistance can
be direct, as when an invalidated statute is reenacted, or tangential, as when
marginally different statutes are enacted. A letter can be private and substantively relevant to a pending case, or public and a general exhortation about
moral "sensitivity."
From a position of pure legalism, it is possible to object to some aspect of
even the most accepted forms of political influence. Theoretically, a proposed
amendment could be inconsistent with basic constitutional provisions or with
some deeper spirit in the overall document.4 It is difficult to imagine in our
system a blunt holding that an amendment is "unconstitutional," but certainly a
new provision could, for similar reasons, be emptied of any significant meaning.
Although the argument is no longer common, some still urge that the Senate's
advice-and-consent function should be limited to consideration of technocratic
qualifications, rather than philosophy, ideology, or probable voting patterns.5
To the extent traditional legal materials and methods are thought to be properly
determinative of constitutional meaning, it is regrettable to have influence from
any group or institution for which such legal values have low priority.
On the other hand, from a position of pure realism, it is possible to see even
the most irregular forms of influence as potentially useful to judicial decisionmaking. The reenactment of a statute already held unconstitutional can be
justified as providing the courts with an opportunity for sober second thought.
The prospect of violent resistance to a decree is a relevant consideration if the
courts seek to preserve their institutional prestige or to take care of the physical
safety of members of the plaintiff class; violence can even be seen as a sign of
heartfelt conviction.6 If practical or political considerations should be an
important part of judicial interpretation, disagreement arising from virtually any
"real-life" circumstance is relevant and potentially important information.

4. Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 111, 124 (1989)
(arguing that a proposed constitutional amendment authorizing the protection of the physical integrity
of the flag of the United States would "weaken ... our constitutional order").
5. E.g., Bruce Fein, A CircumscribedSenate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1989).
6. In Alexander Bickel's words,
[w]hen the law summons force to its aid, it demonstrates, not its strength and stability, but its
weakness and impermanence. The mob, like revolution, is an ambiguous fact. The mob is bad
when it is wrong; it may be heroic when it is right. It is surely a deeply ingrained American
belief that mobs of our people do not generally gather to oppose good laws, and the very fact
of the mob, therefore, puts the law in question.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF

POLITICS 266 (2d ed. 1986).
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Because our interpretative practices are both legalistic and realistic,
incongruous positions on political influence are always starkly evident.7 Many
will agree, with a knowing wink, that courts must follow the election returns and
react to other significant signs of the times; indeed, it is commonplace to assert
that judges should have "a decent regard for public opinion."' We fear,
however, for the rule of law when masses of people march in front of a judicial
building. Observers believe it is sensible for the Senate to guess how judicial
nominees are likely to vote by asking about their personal lives, their political
philosophies, and their opinions on famous cases, but most disapprove when
senators ask directly how a hypothetical case should be decided.9 Jurists who
would be offended by a personal letter about a pending case take home law
review articles that are, in effect, extended briefs. Judges who would never
dream of utilizing out-of-court evidence do not hesitate to rely on extra-judicial
experiences or on conversations with a clerk. Justices prophesy that overruling
the "central holding" in Roe v. Wade"° while "under fire" would endanger "the
character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of
law."11 The same Justices working under the same political circumstances see
no threat to the social fabric in tossing out Roe's famous trimester scheme.
Observers, of course, have offered some explanations for these kinds of
Refinements, distinctions, and theories exist in
apparent incongruities.
abundance. Some of these have provided considerable comfort but, nevertheless,
are not persuasive upon careful examination. Others have force in the abstract
but do not explain very much about actual practices.
Consider our attitudes toward what I will refer to as "local recalcitrance"-the kind of resistance that occurs when state authority is exercised in
ways premised on disagreement with the Court's reasoning or conclusions, but
is not directly defiant. A prime example is the "fire" directed at the Court's

7. Some of these are described and some are demonstrated in papers delivered at the Ira C.
Rothgerber,Jr., Conference on ConstitutionalLaw: ConstitutionalLaw and the Experience of Judging,
61 U. COLO. L. REv. 681, 685-735 (1990). A graphic example can be found in Paul Gewirtz's detailed
and thoughtful article on resistance to school desegregation. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92
YALE L.J. 585 (1983). Although he makes an otherwise thoroughly realistic argument for taking
resistant behavior into account, he inexplicably assumes that if white attitudes represent "blunt
opposition to the right," they should be "completely unrecognizable as an independent interest." Id. at
615.
8. E.g. William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 425,434-35
(1989).
9. This limitation is criticized in Grover Rees, III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at
ConfirmationHearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REv. 913, 932 (1983); The ambivalence
is so acute that during confirmation hearings intellectually rigorous nominees slide back and forth from
moment to moment, first loftily denouncing questions that call for judgments about how cases should
be decided and then matter-of-factly volunteering such answers. Compare Nominationof Robert H. Bork
to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary United States Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1987) [hereinafter nomination of Robert H.
Bork] (statement of Bork asserting that he would not commit himself as to how he might vote on any
particular case) with id. at 114, 279, 288, 327, 428, 829 (Bork committing himself).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1971).
11. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2815-16 (1992).
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abortion decisions-the enactment over the course of two decades of legislation
that burdens the right to abortion.12 Some of these restrictions, while significantly different from the criminal prohibitions invalidated in Roe v. Wade, are
nevertheless hostile to the spirit of that decision. They implicate state interests
that were not explicitly considered in Roe, or they attach somewhat different
weights to individual and state interests than did the Court. They are arguably
inconsistent with the "law" of Roe's trimester system. These laws are aimed at
limiting the right first announced in Roe, and can be seen as efforts to obstruct,
and eventually reverse, that decision.
Local recalcitrance, obviously, has been a widespread and significant form of
resistance to the Court's decisions. It can be seen at the street level when police
officers give Miranda warnings in a hurried, mechanical tone. It can be seen in
the grudging responses of many school boards to desegregation decrees; these
responses are not necessarily segregative, but they do slow or complicate the
achievement of a full remedy. It can be seen in various subtle strategies for
encouraging prayer and other religious activities in the public schools. In each
of its legal settings, local recalcitrance consists of acts aimed at legitimate
objectives:
protecting parental authority over minor children, securing
confessions to crimes, accommodating the exercise of religion, or providing
neighborhood schools. Nevertheless, these acts reflect a different, and arguably
inconsistent, set of priorities from those that underlie judicial decisions.
Sometimes the Court uses local recalcitrance as an unexceptional opportunity
to define the limits of a prior holding." Under certain assumptions this
certainly makes sense. After all, it is at least possible that, in some circumstances, judges might have something to learn from local officials, even concerning
traditional aspects of legal interpretation.14 For example, authoritative judicial
constructions, prior to 1937, of the text "commerce . . . among the several
States"" were not necessarily more sophisticated than the competing interpretations common in the political arena. Similarly, the historical claim that the
Establishment Clause was intended to create a high and impregnable wall
between church and state was received with justifiable skepticism by many
outside the judicial system.

12.

For a description, see Pearson & Kurtz, supra note 1.

13. See, e.g., PlannedParenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2815 (abandoning trimester system as not being part
of the "core" of Roe's holding); Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (applying
trimester system flexibly); Dayton Bd.of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (modifying
"root and branch" desegregation remedy by adding significant requirement of causality); Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (modifying "root and branch" remedy by need to preserve
school district boundaries).
14. This possibility was one of the assumptions behind then Attorney General Edwin Meese's
notorious argument for political correction of decisions that do not conform to the Constitution. Edwin
Meese, III, The Law of the Constitution,61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987). Although it is axiomatic among
lawyers that judges are especially competent to examine historical materials and to parse text, this
confidence may be more a function of professional bias than of the Court's actual record.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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More importantly, formal legal materials are not sufficient bases for
interpretations involving matters like abortion, police practices, school prayer,
and school desegregation. Decisions in these areas, as in much of modem
constitutional law, are thought to be appropriately influenced by judgments
about such matters as political and social history, moral philosophy, psychology,
education, organization theory, medical science, sociology, and so on.16 State
legislatures, police departments, and local school boards undeniably have access
to information and experience relevant to such issues. The political response to
Roe, for instance, provided a troubling rebuttal to the Court's initial itemization
and evaluation of possible state interests in the regulation of abortion. The
Court's refusal to note and consider such reactions would amount, under the
realist view, to willful blindness.
Sometimes, however, the Court treats local recalcitrance as irrelevant or
illegitimate. This assessment is often announced as if its bases were self-evident.
It is occasionally accompanied by loose analogies to violent defiance and
embellished with expansive bromides about the meaning of Marbury v.
Madison.17 Given the highly political nature of the considerations relevant to
modem constitutional interpretation, unrefined arguments based on legal
formalism are plainly unsatisfactory. But more promising justifications can be
pieced together.
A relatively sophisticated "rule-of-law" justification begins with some
structural principles. Resistance from state and local officials is different from
disagreement that is manifested by the political branches at the national level.18
Under the theory of separation of powers, consideration of both Congress's and
the President's constitutional judgments is the natural inference from their
coordinate status. This inference is especially strong when authority over a
specific area is textually committed to one of those branches, as is the case with
respect to the enforcement of the right to equal protection or the regulation of
commerce. It is primarily in such areas that the Court has shown a willingness
to consider resistant judgments of the other branches.
In contrast, the formal acts of state and local governments are, of course,
inferior to federal law. The substance of certain constitutional provisions may
require consideration of state legislative activity, but in these instances state
actions are relevant merely as an objective measure of some social fact. For

16. See Robert F. Nagel, PoliticalLaw, LegalisticPolitics: A Recent History of the PoliticalQuestion
Doctrine, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 643, 661-62 (1989).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,771 (1986); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549,552 n.4 (1969); Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
18. Occasionally, academic writers suggest that state actions should have some authoritative force.
See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1186-87 (1977).
Most proposals, however, single out congressional action as the appropriate way to revise the Court's
decisions. AGRESTO, supra note 3, at 135; DIMOND, supra note 3, at 13-20; Daniel 0. Conkle,
NonoriginalistConstitutional Rights and the Problem of JudicialFinality, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 9,
37 (1985); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court,1974 Term-Forward: ConstitutionalCommon Law,
89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975).
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example, the pattern of state capital punishment laws is relevant to whether a
penalty is "unusual" under the Eighth Amendment, and customary expectations
about a particular form of privacy are relevant to the meaning of "search" under
the fourth amendment. But as judgments, as acts of disagreement with
interpretations of the Supreme Court, it is argued that state laws are, at best,
irrelevant and, at worst, illegitimate. They are illegitimate, according to the
structural argument, not only because of the supremacy principle, but also
because of the nature of constitutional limitations and judicial review.
Constitutional principles are necessarily checks on momentary majoritarian
pressures; the advantage of judicial enforcement is that federal judges are
insulated from, rather than responsive to, politics. To surrender to disagreement,
then, would defeat the entire enterprise.
These structural claims are supplemented by a pragmatic argument about the
role of courts in maintaining the legal system. This part of the rule-of-law
justification asserts that, even at the national level, resistance to authoritative
judicial determinations is permissible only for practical issues surrounding the
choice of means, not for ultimate judgments about legal meaning. In explaining
its decisions allocating authority to enforce the Constitution, the Court has rather
consistently adhered to this distinction.19 Significant justifications can be
asserted for this version of the "myth" of judicial finality. If dialogue theory
were extended to legitimate political efforts to curb or overrule judicial decisions
concerning constitutional meaning, every defiant official act would have
something like the effect of a petition for rehearing. Acts prompted by
disagreement would be rewarded by judicial attention. Every decided case would
invite a cycle of resistance and revision.
The pragmatic argument emphasizes that the function of adjudication is to
resolve disputes, not to engender endless controversy and uncertainty.
Moreover, the purpose of judicial review in constitutional cases is partly to
articulate clear and enduring principles. Ultimately, the rule of law itself
requires more than official compliance with judicial decrees; it requires
widespread habits of mind that conceive of the announced law as authoritatively

19. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1985); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980);
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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For all these reasons, it is claimed that recalcitrance

should be excluded as a consideration in legal interpretation.
The second component of the rule-of-law argument does not depend on the
assumption that courts should refer only to traditional legal sources or that they
should monopolize the interpretive function. It acknowledges that legitimate

political influence can occur, but insists that, generally, it should occur when
legislative and executive officials act in advance of adjudication. At this stage,
political officers must, as a part of their duties, say "what the law is"; these
decisions should be respected by judges.2" Comity at this stage does not reward
disagreement or destabilize judicially announced law. Thus, in separation of

power cases, it is appropriate for courts to consider prolonged executive and
legislative practices.2 2 But, once the Court has, for example, invalidated the
legislative veto, continued resort to this practice by Congress should not count
in subsequent adjudication.' Still less should courts consider local recalcitrance

on abortion and desegregation.
The realist critique of judicial finality is largely based on the observable fact
that written opinions and decrees are neither the only nor the last source of
constitutional law. The rule-of-law argument sketched above acknowledges that
the law develops from many sources and that it continues to develop after each
judicial decision. The argument, which is based on constitutional structure and
text, as well as on practical claims about the functions of adjudication, purports
to be consistent with actual practices. It asserts both that judges normally do not
treat local recalcitrance as legitimate interpretative consideration and that they
should not.

An extravagant version of this argument can be found in Casey. There the Court asserted:
[The American people's] belief in themselves.., as a people [who aspire to live
by the rule of law] is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court
invested with the authority to... speak before all others for their constitutional
ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country
be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals.
112 S. Ct. at 2816. Here, and in related passages, the connections between closure, principle, and the
appearance of imperviousness are made explicit. The Court's rather romantic claims, however, purport
to be specific to Brown and Roe, where the Court supposedly called "the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division...." Id. at 2815. This limitation is unconvincing and perhaps
disingenuous. Neither the Burger nor Rehnquist Court has explicitly overruled any major rights decision
(although, as in Casey, many have been whittled away). This record strongly suggests that what is at
stake is generalized unwillingness to invite disagreement by appearing to have rewarded recalcitrance.
In any event, it does not seem likely that the social importance of the Court's role as expositor of law
is implicated in an altogether different, and lesser, way in such cases as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989),
than in Roe and Brown.
21. An early and influential argument for shared interpretive authority emphasized that legislative
determinations precede judicial ones. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135-36 (1893).
22. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-82 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
23. For an account of congressional resistance to I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), see Louis
Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 57 (1990).
20.
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The remainder of this article describes how the judiciary uses "tradition" to
define due process rights and how it expands its definitions of rights in reaction
to popular resistance to prior rulings. These interpretive practices are so
widespread as to be responsible for a great part of modem constitutional law.
I will argue that these practices cannot be reconciled with the rule-of-law
argument, and that, to the extent they can be justified, judicial consideration of
local recalcitrance is justified too, even when rights are narrowed as a consequence.
III
LEGAL TRADITIONS AND RIGHTS

The use of tradition to define constitutional rights has been effectively
criticized, but it remains a major tenet of modern jurisprudential orthodoxy.
Judge Robert Bork's objections to it were one major reason that hundreds of law
professors opposed his nomination to the Supreme Court. 4 It was said that
Bork's position set him "apart from the entire 200-year-old tradition of thought
about rights that underlies the American Constitution."'
Whether or not this
sweeping claim is accurate, the range of Justices who in modem times have relied
on tradition to define rights is impressive; it includes Earl Warren, William
Douglas, William Brennan, Arthur Goldberg, John Marshall Harlan, Warren
Burger, Lewis Powell, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, and John Paul
Stevens. 26 The thinking of many authoritative jurists, eminent scholars, and
important politicians converges on the ideas that the Constitution protects
implied rights and that these rights should be defined in significant part by
judicial examination of our traditions.
This consensus coexists with the broad agreement that judges should not
constrict rights in response to local political recalcitrance. Of course, it is
impossible to assert that exactly the same people hold both views, but there is
little doubt of substantial overlap. 7 It is not too much to say that these are two
of the dominant tenets of our legal culture.
At least superficially, these tenets involve opposite evaluations of the status
of local lawmaking in constitutional interpretation. This is true despite the fact

24. Nomination of Robert H. Bork, supra note 9, at 1336 (letter to chairman Biden and Senator
Thurmond from 100 law professors opposing Judge Bork's confirmation as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, Sept. 22, 1987).
25. Id. at 1278 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe).
26. See infra notes 28 and 29.
27. Justice Blackmun (who in Roe examined state laws, the positions of professional organizations,
and various religious and philosophical writings) has vigorously protested judicial responsiveness to
political influence. See, eg., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 759, 771 (1986). Other Justices, who think that political traditions are relevant, have also objected
to political pressure. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 8, at 425; William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a
Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1976); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHi. L. REv., 1175, 1179-80 (1989).
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that there is wide variation in how judges define our national traditions. They
have examined everything from Greek and Roman beliefs, to the positions of the
American Public Health Association, to recent changes in social morality and
private behavior. But judicial descriptions of our traditions virtually always take
into account local positive law.'
Hence, one of the important tenets of
constitutional adjudication-that judges should consider local lawmaking when
identifying those traditions that define constitutional rights-appears to be in
considerable tension with a second tenet, which holds that in defining constitutional rights judges should not consider local lawmaking if it expresses strong
disagreement with prior judicial decisions.
Perhaps this tension does not involve real contradiction. Certainly, the
pragmatic argument for interpretive stability suggests some reasons for
differential treatment. When the positive law is used in defining constitutional
traditions, there can be little risk of engendering a chaotic cycle of revision.
Although there is always a remote chance that statutory changes may be
encouraged by the knowledge that courts pay attention to them when interpreting the due process clause, this possibility is attenuated. After all, changes in the
law are motivated by many factors; these changes would influence the courts only
as a single part of a long history. By definition, however, recalcitrant governmental actions express dissatisfaction with specific case outcomes. Therefore,
anticipated judicial receptivity is likely to encourage recalcitrance. Moreover,
public officials whose actions were motivated by disagreement with the courts
may be inclined to overestimate the impact that their recalcitrant decisions have
had. Thus, any acknowledged consideration of these decisions in a judicial
opinion may promote additional resistance.
Furthermore, to the extent the objective is stability, or apparent stability, in
announced meaning, there is a relevant difference between federal and state
recalcitrance. Although stability can certainly be undermined by revisions
initiated by congressional or presidential actions, the institutional sources for this
instability are at least limited to two branches of government. In contrast, the
innumerable jurisdictions at the state and local level provide a vast reservoir for
recalcitrant action. These disparate authorities are not disciplined by the
institutional and political checks that exist for the national government.
Therefore, it may be that the practical need to foster compliant mental habits
and to articulate clear, lasting principles is especially great when federal courts
review the actions of state authorities.
The need for interpretive stability, however, is not the only consideration.
The reasons why traditions are relevant to constitutional interpretation are, to
some extent, also reasons for considering recalcitrant local lawmaking. Judges
refer to tradition, including the positive law, in part because their task is to

28. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 192-94 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-41 (1973).
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'
Tradition
identify liberties that are especially important or "fundamental." 29
represents an accumulation of public and private judgments about the moral or
political significance of a particular freedom and is, therefore, relevant to the
substance of the decision facing the judge. It is always open to question whether
any particular aspect of received tradition represents wise moral choice, but it is
not necessary that an interpretative source be infallible for it to be worth
consulting. Moreover, even morally doubtful traditions have the advantage of
expressing continuing consent-of representing "the Constitution" as actually
understood and lived by the people.'
In using tradition, judges also aspire to make differentiations between
ordinary rights and fundamental rights on some basis other than their own
personal predilections;" they intend to give assurance that judicial determinations are bounded (by the external standard that has been consulted) and
authoritative (or, at least, of greater weight than a personal opinion, impulse, or
emotion). Traditions, at least, are constituted by the behavior and thought of
many people aside from the judge.
These justifications suggest that patterns of local lawmaking should be
relevant even when they are recalcitrant. Nevertheless, it is possible to insist that
official acts in response to, and in disagreement with, judicial decisions do not
represent deeply embedded judgments about wisdom or morality. They can be
described as sudden and untested reactions to current controversies. Recalcitrant
lawmaking, that is, might be simply too new to be included as a component of
tradition. This is unconvincing for at least two reasons. First, there is no reason
to exclude the possibility that recalcitrant acts are efforts to reconstitute some
version of older understandings and practices. Indeed, much of the popular
dissatisfaction with the Court's modern decisions has been based on deeply
traditional notions about such matters as family values, sex roles, educational
methods, religion, and neighborhood life.32
Second, it is an obvious oversimplification to conceive of tradition as
unchanging. Experience accumulates by way of experimentation and adaptation.
Contemporary political behavior, including official recalcitrance, is a part of our
collective life and is relevant to understanding our underlying traditions.
Presumably, this is why Justices as different as Brennan, Blackmun, and Scalia
have all examined patterns of modern statutory change when depicting legal
traditions.33

29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 493-94 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923).
30. A theme developed in ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989).
31. Griswold,381 U.S. at 493 ("Judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal
and private notions.") (Goldberg, J., concurring).
32. For a wide-ranging description of the traditional "world view" that underlies opposition to Roe
v. Wade, see KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
33. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-28 (1989) (Scalia, J.); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 138-41 (1973) (Blackmun, J.).
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To the extent judges use tradition in constitutional interpretation as a way of
assuring some degree of democratic consent, the exclusion of recalcitrant acts is
counterproductive.
Whether political traditions are static or changing,
recalcitrance suggests that an earlier judicial decision is contradictory to the
understanding of some segment of the public. In a particular case, there may be
reasons why a wave of resistance does not indicate any lack of deeper consent,
but these reasons will be offered only in response to candid consideration of the
extent and significance of local recalcitrance.

Needless to say, it is highly controversial whether resorting to tradition can
provide authoritative standards that are bounded and external to the judge.
Nevertheless, our current practices commit us to hope that tradition can provide
at least some objectivity. One would think that to the extent any legal
justification, including tradition, effectively constrains judges and commands
general respect, reconsideration ought to be proportionately less risky both
institutionally and intellectually. Possibly, embattled judges who ignore dissent
could appear to be faithful and impersonal expositors of the law, but they are at
least as likely to appear to be arbitrary and willful. In the original abortion
decision, Justice Blackmun's lengthy description of our legal and moral traditions
was an earnest endeavor to "resolve the issue by constitutional measurement,
free of emotion and predilection."' Ironically, however, nothing undermined
and unmasked this effort at objectivity more than his later venting of personal
outrage at decades of local recalcitrance, which he could see only as illegitimate
defiance.35 Calm deliberation about disagreement, on the other hand, can
convey a sense of confidence consistent with the ideal of objectivity.
In short, the reasons usually offered for using tradition in constitutional
interpretation also support considering local recalcitrance. More importantly,
those reasons seriously undermine the structural aspect of the rule-of-law
argument. Recall that this part of the argument contrasts recalcitrant acts of the
coordinate branches of the national government with local recalcitrance. The
argument concedes that judicial deference is often appropriate to federal
decisionmakers (because of their assigned duties under the Constitution) but
denies that deference is appropriate to state authority (because it is exercised
subject to the Supremacy Clause). Even if state and local acts can sometimes be
relevant as independent data, they are not relevant as expressions of judgment
about constitutional law, which should be defined independently of majoritarian
pressures.
Our practice of using tradition, including local positive law, to define
constitutional rights is at odds both with this sharp distinction between federal
and state authority and with strict counter-majoritarianism. In this practice, state
laws are consulted because they represent a cumulative view about what

34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
35. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 490 U.S. 490, 538, 556-58, 560 (1989);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759, 771 (1986).
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freedoms are fundamental; thus, the judgments of state authorities are relevant
on the constitutional issue itself. Indeed, Justices sometimes describe traditional
unenumerated or implied rights as predating, and underlying, the written
Constitution. Justice Douglas, for instance, found the constitutional right to use
contraceptives in "a right to privacy older than the Bill of Rights."'
Plainly,
this approach assigns to state and local decisionmakers a direct role in giving
meaning to the Constitution.
Contemporary judges and scholars who approve of this role must believe it
is consistent with separation of powers and the Supremacy Clause. As a matter
of logic, it is certainly possible for the exercise of state authority to be inferior
to federal law and, yet, still be a constituent element of that superior law. If it
is correct, as our use of tradition in due process cases assumes, that both official
and private actions at the local level should make up some part of the
fundamental law, federal judges are obligated to give effect to those local actions
as a part of their obligation to give effect to the Constitution itself Under this
view, the Supremacy Clause actually requires consideration of, and even
deference to, the exercise of state and local authority. Moreover, constitutional
limitations are not to be defined entirely independently of majoritarian
preferences; indeed part of the judicial function is to understand how those
preferences bear on our deeper political traditions.
This logic is borne out by the distribution of authority in the text of the
Constitution. The rule-of-law argument is wrong in its assumption that only the
coordinate branches of the national government are assigned duties that
necessarily involve constitutional judgment. Just as Congress is assigned the
power to regulate commerce among the states and the President is given limited
authority over foreign affairs, the text delegates some national duties to state
governments and to the people. State legislatures, for example, have final
authority to determine "the Places of choosing Senators."37 The states appoint
3
presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."
States must decide, as an initial matter, what it means to give full faith and credit
to the official acts of other states. 39 The exercise of state regulatory power can
require legal judgments by the states and their people about what powers were
"not delegated" to the United States.' In fact, one fundamental purpose of
state governments in the constitutional scheme is to provide a "counterpoise"
against federal officials when they ignore limitations in their assigned roles.41
Finally, the people, who retain rights that are not enumerated, 42 must continue
to decide what it is they have retained. In sum, the use of state and local laws
to help define constitutional traditions is fully consistent with the constitutional
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl.
2.
Id. art. IV, § 1.
Id. amend. X.
See AkhiI Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1500 (1987).
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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structure. It thus severely undercuts a significant part of the argument against
judicial consideration of local recalcitrant acts.
Of course, it does not follow that federal courts should treat local recalcitrance as an interpretive consideration. It does not even follow that they should
consider recalcitrance at the local and national levels as legal equivalents. The
pragmatic component of the rule-of-law argument may satisfactorily explain why
judges should view recalcitrant laws differently from other political acts and why
they should discourage recalcitrance by state officials more than recalcitrance by
federal officials. There is, however, another widespread modern judicial practice
that throws the pragmatic argument for stability into doubt: the strong tendency
of courts to expand rights in the face of actual or anticipated disagreement. I
turn next to an examination of this practice.
IV
RESISTANCE AND THE EXPANSION OF RIGHTS

The prevalent instinct to condemn the Rehnquist Court for narrowing rights
in reaction to political resistance is not disturbed by extensive reflection about
how those rights came to be widened in the first place. The truth, which is well
known but usually left unspoken, is that the constitutional rights that are now
being constricted were once enlarged as a judicial response to local recalcitrance.
When this fact is raised to the surface, it presents several difficult questions.
What justification might there be for judges treating official disagreement as a
reason to expand the definition of rights? And, if such a justification exists, does
its logic imply that sometimes disagreement can also be a reason to restrict the
definition of rights? Before addressing these questions, I shall explain how we
can identify recalcitrant local action as one significant interpretive consideration
behind the modern "rights explosion."
A. The Practice of Expanding Rights
It sounds odd to say that judges have enlarged rights because public officials
have disapproved of these rights. Widespread approval of a decision, of course,
might be a reason for augmentation, just as it might be prudent to back away
from a decision in the face of disagreement. The judgment of others is always
relevant as a form of validation, but it would seem perverse to be fortified by
dissension. Perversity, however, is sometimes rewarded. Many of the modern
Court's most admired decisions have met resistance that was eventually
discredited. Southern opposition to Brown v. Board of Education, now part of
our national folklore, was fervent and sometimes ugly, but was largely
overcome.4 3 Initial indications that President Richard Nixon would defy a

43.

How much Brown itself contributed to desegregation is a more complicated question than is

usually admitted. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE (1991). The mythology, especially within the legal profession, however, is that

courageous judges gradually faced down the opposition.
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grand jury subpoena for the Watergate tapes caused serious concern, but he
finally complied with the decision in United States v. Nixon and turned over the
tapes." It is hardly implausible to think that people, including judges, want to
be admired for their courage and morality. Consequently, it is not unlikely that
many federal judges aspire to use the superior virtues thought to be represented
by the Constitution to confront some aspect of the general culture and to
transform it.45
Engendering and surmounting disagreement have, in fact, become significant
aspects of the judiciary's role. The conception of the judge as heroic social
reformer has not been left to the private imaginings of jurists. This ideal has
been portrayed in admiring biographies and has been rationalized in elaborate
academic commentary.' It is embodied in the achievements and the reputations of people like Frank Johnson, Frank Bazelon, William Wayne Justice, Earl
Warren, William Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and Thurgood Marshall. The allure
of heroism may be obvious, but how is it possible to know that in specific cases
judges have expanded rights in reaction to official disagreement? The answer
in at least some classes of cases lies in the Court's own explanations. These
types of cases are not minor or aberrational. Together they have been and
continue to be a significant factor in our modern constitutional jurisprudence.
1. Impermissible Motivation. In some constitutional decisions disagreement is
cast as an illicit motive and, thus, is explicitly treated as an interpretive
consideration. The Court, for instance, has long said that under the Establishment Clause state statutes must have a secular legislative purpose. Consequently, it has been an important (and sometimes determinative) consideration
whether laws were motivated by a desire to foster religion. One of the Court's
duties is to determine what particular governmental actions impermissibly foster
religion. When local authorities desire to induce a reversal of any such
determination, their motive can be said to be, by definition, the fostering of
religion. This means that a law not otherwise in violation of the Establishment
Clause can be found to be invalid on the ground that it was motivated by
disagreement with an earlier judicial determination.

44. This case apparently had a major positive impact on the Court's public image. Walter F.
Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 985, 1006-07
(1990).
45. I developed this theme in my book. See NAGEL supra note 30, at 1-4, 23, 153-55.
46. For two examples, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF-EARL WARREN AND His
SUPREME COURT (1983) and TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDGE FRANK JOHNSON AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN ALABAMA (1981). For one egregious effort to characterize questionable tactics as "judicial
statesmanship," see Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977). In this regard, it is worth
noting the dedication page of what is probably the most admired recent book on constitutional law:
For Earl Warren
You don't need many heroes
if you choose carefully.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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This logic is illustrated in Wallace v. Jaffree,47 where the Court invalidated
an Alabama statute that authorized public school teachers to announce periods
of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer." The Court said that the state's
actual purpose had been "to characterize prayer as a favored practice" and "to
The terms of the statute neither
return prayer to the public schools."'
endorsed prayer nor returned official prayers to public schools. In fact, what the
statute itself permitted-for students to meditate or pray during a moment of
silence-was not unconstitutional. The Court in Wallace was quite clear about
this, as it had to be, since to allow all thoughts except prayerful thoughts would
itself be unconstitutional. Thus, if the effect of the statute was to permit
something that is perfectly legal, why should the motives of the legislators have
mattered?
One possible answer is that motivation changed the effective meaning of the
statute. It is true that, if communicated to students, legislative intentions could
have converted permission into endorsement. Certainly the literal message "You
may pray," can be understood to mean "You should pray." For example, if the
speaker has just finished a sermon, the permissive words could convey something
even stronger than encouragement. The words alone, if uttered with a certain
intonation, could also be received as an endorsement. Consider, however, the
evidence the Court offered about legislative motivation. Senator Donald
Holmes, a sponsor of the bill, inserted in the legislative record a statement that
it was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools.49 This same
Senator later confirmed in sworn testimony before the federal district court that
this was his objective. Moreover, an earlier piece of legislation had already
required a moment for "meditation." Since, according to the Court, "meditation" includes prayer, the later addition of the words "or voluntary prayer" could
only have been intended to send the "message of State endorsement and
promotion of prayer. '
It may be safely assumed that neither school students, nor their teachers,
normally study official legislative records or the transcripts of trials in federal
court. Any student who read the words of the 1984 statute and then carefully
compared them with the language in previously existing legislation is surely to
be identified as exceptional. Therefore, even if the Court was correct in its
claims about the motivations of the state legislature, it was not correct in
assuming that the basis for those claims had been communicated along with the
statutory language itself. The Court, in short, failed to explain why students or
teachers would understand the 1984 provision as an endorsement of religion.
In what sense, then, were legislative intentions relevant? Perhaps they were
constitutionally impermissible, but why? Putting aside the possibility that
disagreement with the Court's school prayer decisions is per se improper, the
47.
48.
49.
50.

472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985).
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 59.
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most likely answer is that the Court acted preemptively. Because the members
of the Alabama legislature wanted to circumvent or reverse Engel v. Vitale,"1
the Court understood the moment of silence statute as the first step in a
campaign that could eventually lead to an unconstitutional result. This, however,
is to say that lawful action, if motivated by disagreement, can become illegal.
The case of Wallace v. Jaffree5 is not unusual. In the murky judicial
business of characterizing official motivation, disagreement with the courts can
often be discerned as one indicator of illicitness. For example, in United States
v. Eichman,53 which re-affirmed and extended the year-old holding that flag
protection laws violate freedom of speech, the Court treated the political
groundswell that preceded Congress's action as evidence that the purpose of the
Similarly, in Thornburgh v.
law was to suppress unpopular messages.'
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,5 the Court alluded to the
history of recalcitrant state abortion regulations as evidence that the purpose
behind one state's "informed consent" rules was to "intimidate women" and "to
deter" abortions. Moreover, in cases like Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick, 6 local school boards around the country have been found guilty of
"segregative intent" because they had "failed to heed their duty" to achieve
racial balance after Brown v. Board of Education.57 In each of these cases,
rights were extended into new territory. Flag desecration laws became invalid
even when they did not single out offensive conduct. The freedom to decide
whether to have an abortion grew to include a right to have physicians decide
when to withhold unpleasant, but truthful, information. The right to attend
schools on a nondiscriminatory basis expanded to overlap substantially with a
right to attend racially balanced schools. Perhaps these extensions were wise;
certainly, the dominant opinion in the practicing bar and the legal academy
supported them. We should, then, face up to the implications of the fact that
these decisions were justified in part by reference to official disagreement with
prior judicial decisions.
2. Risk Valuation. Lawyers tend to project the perspective of the time of
adjudication backward onto the time of action. We are in the habit of saying

51. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
52. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
53. 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990).
54. The Court stated,
We decline the Government's invitation to reassess this conclusion [that the public interest in
"national unity" was sufficiently important to satisfy "the most exacting scrutiny"] in light of
Congress' recent recognition of a purported "national consensus" favoring a prohibition on flagburning. Even assuming such a consensus exists, any suggestion that the Government's interest
... becomes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows in foreign to the First
Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
55. 476 U.S. 747, 759-64 (1986).
56. 443 U.S. 449, 463 (1979).
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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that official acts were either constitutional or unconstitutional because a judge
later found them to be so. From the perspective of the governmental decisionmaker, however, it would often be more accurate to speak in terms of risk of
illegality. This is not a reference to the vagaries of trying to predict a judge's
eventual decision, but instead to the fact that often "unconstitutionality" is a
compound condition so that no single official is in control of all the components
of that condition.
Consider, for example, a school board in a district that at one time
segregated its students. As indicated in the preceding section, it would violate
the Equal Protection Clause for such a board to perpetuate racial imbalance by
adopting a neighborhood school policy if the motivation for this decision were
to resist the goal of integration."8 Suppose that board members vote for a
neighborhood placement plan and do so with the expectation that continued
racial imbalance will result. Can they know that this conduct is unconstitutional
as the vote is cast? Although they can know something about their own
motivations, they cannot be sure whether the expectation of racial imbalance will
turn out to be fulfilled. This will depend on the decisions of others, including
zoning officials, real estate agents, and parents. The most that can be said is that
the vote helps to create a risk of a constitutional violation.
Obviously, public officials who disagree with a judicial decision will be
relatively likely to make decisions that create a high risk of violation. They may
value certain countervailing considerations more highly than did the judge; they
may have greater tolerance for factual uncertainties; they may hope that any
unconstitutionality that does result will lead to a re-interpretation; or they may
simply care little about obedience to a legal principle that seems incorrect. In
any event, judges faced with this form of recalcitrance have a strong incentive to
broaden the range of prohibited behavior so as to reduce the risk of violation.
This dynamic has been an explicit factor in the modern judiciary's expansion
of rights. 9 The most famous and clearest examples have arisen in the context
of criminal law enforcement. For example, because police need to be deterred
from illegal searches and interrogations, judges must exclude from criminal trials
illegally seized evidence and confessions not complying with the requirements of
Miranda.' These requirements rest heavily on the need to instill "respect" for
the constitutional value and to assure full compliance.61 The problem, as
recounted in great detail in Miranda, is not merely that the police are likely to
coerce confessions in the "traditional sense," but that they skate too close to the
edge, engaging in tricks and strategies that can turn out, in particular circum-

58. Id. at 461-63.
59. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 190, 203 (1988)
(arguing that a common feature of constitutional interpretation is to "take into account institutional
limitations and propensities").
60. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,348 (1974) (enunciating the exclusionary rule); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
61. See Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the ConstitutionalCommon Law, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1117, 1118-20 (1978).
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stances or with particular suspects, to be coercive.62 Police, in short, take
unacceptable risks. That is a major reason why custodial interrogation is
"inherently" coercive and why prophylactic warnings are necessary.
The criminal procedure cases provoked attention because the decisions
themselves specifically distinguish between the substance of the constitutional
rights involved and the instrumental measures that the Court was proposing as
useful in protecting those rights.63 It is especiallyclear in these cases that the
area of proscribed conduct has grown larger than what the Constitution itself
requires. In masses of more ordinary cases, however, the dynamic of risk
management can also be seen at work. In virtually every area of modem
constitutional law, principles are made operational with easily remembered
aphorisms, bright-line rules, hard categories, illustrative dicta, or elaborate
doctrines.6 These everyday judicial techniques are employed in order to
educate, inspire, intimidate, and control. This is thought to be necessary for
many reasons. The basic one is that the public and its officials do not sufficiently
appreciate the Supreme Court's enunciated constitutional values and are-if left
to their own devices-likely to take unacceptable risks with those values.
Built into modern interpretive methods, then, is a strong hedge against
disagreement. If judicial decisions are believed to represent the substance of
65
"the Constitution," this hedge is, by definition, also part of that substance.
Viewed this way, it is not possible to say that otherwise legal behavior is being
proscribed due to disagreement. Unlike the illicit motivation cases or the
prophylactic criminal procedure cases, there are no independent standards
acknowledged in the Court's own opinions by which the behavior can be termed
"constitutional." However, opinions typically distinguish ultimate principles,
values, or objectives from implementing rules and doctrines. Indeed, reference
to the former justifies the latter. Thus, it is the objective of robust public debate
that justifies the "actual malice" standard in certain classes of defamation
cases;' it is the importance of the value of personal autonomy that once
explained why restrictions on abortion must serve "compelling governmental
interests"'67 and now explains the "undue burden" standard.' Even within the
terms of the judiciary's interpretations, there is slippage between constitutional
and judicial standards. Some part of this gap consists of proscribed behavior that
is held unconstitutional only because of anticipated disagreement.
3. Motivated Incompetence. One of the most striking and far-reaching aspects
of the modem rights explosion is the extent to which the Constitution has been

62. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-57.
63. See Monaghan, supra note 18, at 3-10.
64. See NAGEL, supra note 30, ch. 7 (describing the modem trend toward greater instrumental
control).
65. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 18, at 23.
66. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
67. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971).
68. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
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construed to require complex regimes of governmental initiatives. Courts have
ordered that prisons be built, that new mental health programs be implemented,
and that school systems be transformed. Not only have federal judges controlled
a spectacular range of governmental decisions, they have done so often and in
jurisdictions across the country.69 The phenomenon has formed a central part
of the public experience of modern judicial power.
From the beginning of the debate over these institutional injunctions, it has
been noted that the Constitution itself does not require many of the specifics in
the decrees.7" No one thinks that our fundamental compact establishes, either
directly or impliedly, the right of inmates to have their food prepared by cooks
with bachelor's degrees in dietetics or the right of school students to have petting
zoos and swimming pools.7" Such requirements are remedial rather than
substantive, and they are justified as means toward constitutional ends.
The connection between institutional injunctions and local resistance is well
known.72 The courts, it is often said, are forced to take over an expanding set
of functions and to make increasingly detailed decisions because the responsible
government officials are responding slowly, inadequately, or not at all. This
general account lumps together many forms of behavior that can result from
disagreement, treating them all as failures that justify further judicial intervention.
Somewhere within this set of resistant behaviors is the category referred to
here as "recalcitrant."73 A warden might, for example, hire new prison guards
in compliance with the terms of a decree, but then not train them properly. Or
a school board might reassign teachers without anticipating the need to
counteract a drop in their morale. These lapses can be described as motivated
incompetence. By "motivated" I do not mean defiant. Creating change in
complex institutions requires more than submission. It requires will, foresight,
enthusiasm, and energy. An official who disagrees with a court's interpretation
of the Constitution will naturally tend not to be fully enlisted in the court's
project. Although disagreement can motivate a person's oversights and although
such mistakes can undermine the objectives of the decree, they do not necessarily
interfere directly or intentionally. In any particular setting, the forms of
resistance to judicial orders are varied and they are matters of degree. Judges

69. There have been, for example, "major court orders" on prisons and jails in forty states.
Malcolm M. Feely & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A
Framework for Analysis and a Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 13 (John J. Dilulio, Jr., eds., 1990).
70. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins & Michael B. Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An
Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and FederalCourt Supervision of State PenalAdministration Under the Eighth

Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893, 917-19 (1977).
71. Id. (on prisoners); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 77 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part)
(on schools).
72. For a discussion concerning the relationship between expansive injunctive relief and local
disagreement, see Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the Structural Injunction, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y.
395, 400-01 (1984) and sources cited therein.
73. See discussion supra at part II.
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cannot be expected to sort out precisely what causes failure. Motivated
incompetence, like other forms of local recalcitrance, is therefore treated as one
more reason to control an ever-widening complex of. otherwise legal conduct.
As remedies expand, rights ate redefined to be vague enough, or broad enough,
to be commensurate with the orders. Therefore, like statutes that are unconstitutional because enacted with "illicit" motivation and like the prophylactic
measures used to prevent dissenting officials from risking constitutional values,
institutional injunctions demonstrate that federal judges have responded to
officials' disagreement by expanding rights.
B. The Justifications for Expanding Rights
The various ways in which courts expand rights in reaction to disagreement
are all questionable. For example, why, as a matter of substantive constitutional
law, should it have mattered that Alabama legislators wanted to endorse prayers
in the public schools if all they did was authorize private moments for meditation
or prayer? Similarly, even if local officials are putting constitutional rights at
risk, by what authority does a court try to prevent constitutional violations before
they have occurred? After violations have occurred, are there any limits on the
authority of federal judges to take over local governmental functions in a
potentially endless quest for full correction? These are difficult questions, but
one basic answer is offered to each: The constitutional obligations of public
officials may be expanded in order to vindicate rights as defined by the judiciary.
State authority is displaced when its exercise threatens federal constitutional
values-that is, when legislation is designed to subvert an announced constitutional value, or when discretionary acts create a risk of constitutional violations,
or when local decisionmaking is ineffective in correcting violations. In essence,
this answer is the structural part of the rule-of-law argument; it asserts that state
authority must be subordinated to the supreme law as enunciated by the federal
courts. Whether or not the answer is fully satisfactory in this context, the
practices that it justifies are solidly entrenched and widely accepted.
As a justification for expanding judicial protections, the answer is familiar.
But why would it not also justify constricting the constitutional obligations of
public officials? If, for example, the objective is to prevent the return of official
prayers to public schools, it may be that religiously motivated legislation should
be permitted as long as it stops short of accomplishing that return. Such
legislation could make the exclusion of official prayers more acceptable and,
thus, might reduce outright defiance. If the objective is to prevent the risk of
involuntary confessions and illegal searches, it could be that the widest possible
range of investigatory techniques should be allowed. Broad local discretion, if
effective in securing convictions, might reduce the pressures and frustrations that
lead to unconstitutional abuses. If the objective is full implementation of
complex institutional reform, it might be that the will and initiative of local
leaders could best be enlisted by insulating them from detailed oversight and the
threat of displacement.
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These possibilities, of course, are doubtful under some assumptions and in
some circumstances. The same, however, can be said of the opposite strategy.
Expanding obligations can vindicate underlying constitutional rights on certain
assumptions and under some circumstances. The expansion technique apparently
strikes many jurists and academics as being more sound.74 This judgment is
defensible, but it hardly justifies the harsh condemnations of judicial retrenchment that coexist with a generally uncritical acceptance of the established
practice of judicial aggrandizement. What is at stake, it turns out, is not the
principle of supremacy, but the relative efficacy of two different protective
strategies.
What can account for the doomsdayish terms in which objections to
retrenchment are often expressed? Why do scholars fear that rights are being
"destroyed" and that the Constitution is "vanishing"? 75 Why do Justices brood
about undermining "the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live
according to the rule of law"? 7 6 These terms are suggestive of deep anxieties
about the durability of our constitutional system, which is portrayed as being in
disarray and under ferocious attack. A second justification for the expansion
strategy, then, is the openly pragmatic part of the rule-of-law argument. The
point is not that expanding rights assures their actualization as required by the
principle of federal supremacy. Rather, expanding rights in the face of
disagreement prevents chaotic cycles of revision in the announced law. It creates
respect for courts as the expositors of law, promotes clarity of principle,
generates public understanding and, eventually, agreement. Under this view,
what is at stake is not merely the implementation of preferred judicial policies,
but the fragile social and psychological supports for the rule of law itself
How, exactly, might expanding constitutional obligations in reaction to local
recalcitrance be expected to accomplish these deeply reassuring goals? The most
obvious answer emerges from contrasting the consequences of the two strategies,
Constricting rights (and correlative legal
retrenchment and expansion.
obligations) rewards disagreement and, thus, invites further recalcitrance. In
contrast, expanding rights increases the costs of recalcitrant action by increasing
the obligations of public officials. Disagreement is thereby discouraged. The
announced law is protected from further political pressure, and the public is
encouraged to develop respectful and compliant attitudes.
The difficulty is the implicit assumption that there will be no cycle of
revision caused by mounting displeasure. It is certainly possible that as
unpopular constitutional meaning is expanded, political dissent will be provoked,
triggering more expansion and more disagreement. As a matter of recent
history, not to mention common sense, this possibility is quite real. The Roe

74. See Gewirtz, supra note 7, at 617-24 (advancing the position that, at least in school
desegregation, less control can sometimes lead to more compliance).
75. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 96-98 (defending the use of the word "vanishing"); Schrock
& Welsh, supra note 61, at 1159 (referring to the "annihilation of rights").
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992).
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trimester scheme can be understood as an effort to forestall recalcitrant state
legislation by predetermining the outcome of many possible future cases. This
expansive strategy provoked especially intense opposition.' Subsequent efforts
to expand on Roe-including the invalidation of parental consent requirements
and informed consent laws-only made the effective meaning of the right to
privacy even more unacceptable to segments of the public. The result has not
been stability or respect for the rule of law.
As a matter of political prediction, the strategies of expanding and restricting
rights both have some potential for discouraging local recalcitrance, but also for
encouraging it. It may be that lawyers tend to overestimate the extent to which
the rule of law depends on respect for courts and on stability in announced
constitutional meaning. The history of judicial review in the United States is
remarkable for the amount of political opposition engendered by the courts'
decisions and for frequent, significant variations in announced doctrine. Stable
understanding of constitutional values and popular commitment to those values
is probably a function far more of social and political life than of judicial
interpretation.7" Judge-made constitutional law may have more to do with
change than with durability. At any rate, the common and accepted practice of
expanding rights in reaction to official recalcitrance severely undercuts both the
structural and pragmatic components of the rule-of-law argument.
V
CONCLUSION

Two prevalent judicial practices-the use of tradition in defining due process
rights and the expansion of rights in reaction to political disagreement-make it
difficult to explain why, in deliberating on constitutional questions, courts should
not consider local recalcitrance. By insisting that judges should never take local
political decisions into account, it is possible, of course, to reject these two
practices and, thus, to avoid the problems they raise. Some, for example, argue
that rights should be defined simply according to what the Constitution itself
mandates.79 The proponents of this position must identify the kinds of knowledge that are properly relevant to this determination and explain why the
experience and understandings of local officials are irrelevant to that knowledge.
Those who are unwilling to take this walk back down the road of legal formalism
can, perhaps, construct a better version of the rule-of-law argument than the one
examined in this article. Otherwise, the safest conclusion seems to be that, while
recalcitrant officials may be wrong, they are not irrelevant.

77.
78.
79.

See LUKER, supra note 32, at 137-44 and ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 185-89.
NAGEL, supra note 30, at 2.
See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 61, at 1171-76.

